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The Impact of Organizational Culture on Concurrent Engineering, Design-for-
Safety, and Product Safety Performance 
 
Abstract  
This paper empirically extends the research on the relationships between organizational culture, 
new product development (NPD) practices, and product safety performance (PSP). Using 
Schein’s conceptualization of culture (i.e., underlying assumptions, espoused values, and 
artefacts), we build and test a model among five variables: top management commitment to 
safety (MCS), group level product safety culture (PSC) at NPD, Concurrent Engineering (CE), 
Design-for-Safety (DFS), and product safety performance. We propose that the underlying 
assumption of safety first affects the espoused values (group level product safety culture at NPD) 
and artefacts of organizational culture (Concurrent Engineering and Design-for-Safety); 
espoused value influences artefacts; and artefacts impact product safety performance. These 
hypotheses are tested by structural analyses of 255 survey responses collected from 126 firms in 
the juvenile product sector. While management commitment to safety, product safety culture, and 
Design-for-Safety are significant product safety predictors, as expected, Concurrent Engineering 
has no significant direct effect on product safety. We discuss the implications of these findings 
for the field of product safety. 
Keywords: organizational culture; new product development; product safety; innovation; 
Concurrent Engineering; Design-for-Safety; performance 
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1.  Introduction 
Product safety is a matter of enormous economic and societal concern. The U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) estimates that in the United States alone, “deaths, 
injuries and property damage from consumer product incidents cost [the US] more than $1 
trillion annually” (CPSC, 2009). Hundreds of millions of consumer products are recalled every 
year for safety risk reasons, and the financial risks to individual firms are significant, too: White 
and Pomponi (2003) estimated the average cost to manufacturers for every recall at about $8 
million. For example, General Motors recalled 28 million cars worldwide due to faulty ignition 
switches in 2014 at a cost estimated in the billions of dollars (Popper, 2014). At the very least, 
sub-par product safety and product recalls tarnish a manufacturer’s reputation and damage 
product brands. 
There is overwhelming research that shows product safety is largely determined by how 
well a firm controls its NPD process: approximately 70% of product recalls have been traced to 
shortcomings in product development (Beamish & Bapuji, 2008; White & Pomponi, 2003). Our 
paper empirically examines the impact of NPD on product safety. We add to the pertinent 
literature on product safety in three aspects: 
1) Product safety and its relationship with NPD. Most empirical studies on product safety 
focus on technical aspects and overlook the effect of product safety on culture (Abbott & 
Tyler, 1997; Main & Frantz, 1994; Main & McMurphy, 1998; Moller & Hansson, 2008; 
Wang & Ruxton, 1997). Much of the literature on this topic appears to be anecdotal and 
prescriptive. 
2) Product safety performance rather than general product quality. Only a handful of studies 
on NPD include product safety when measuring product quality (Koufteros et al., 2001, 
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2002; Koufteros & Marcoulides, 2006; Sethi, 2000). Product safety has never been 
included as an independent variable, and product safety management practices and tools 
are not explicitly explored in any of the studies on NPD and product quality (Calantone 
& Benedetto, 1988; McDonough, 2000; Millson & Wilemon, 2008; Rusinko, 1997; Song 
et al., 1997; Song & Parry, 1997; Tatikonda & Montoya-Weiss, 2001), although some 
(e.g., Fynes & De Búrca, 2005) have considered conformance quality (design quality, 
conformance quality, external quality-in-use, product cost, time-to-market and customer 
satisfaction) and customer complaints as measures of product quality performance. 
3) Product safety and NPD in the context of organizational culture. Only a few studies have 
investigated the relationship between organizational product safety culture and product 
safety (European Commission, 2008; Svenson, 1984; White & Pomponi, 2003) both 
from theoretical discourse and industry best practice. 
Earlier work using Schein’s (1992) conceptualization of culture (e.g., Koufteros et al., 
2007; Nahm et al., 2004; Yauch & Steudel, 2002) evaluated the effects of organizational culture 
on manufacturing practices and firm performance. Extending this conceptualization of culture, 
we test a model among five variables: 1) top management commitment to safety, 2) group level 
product safety culture at NPD, 3) Concurrent Engineering, 4) Design-for-Safety, and 5) product 
safety performance. We investigate the assumption that improvements in those five key variables 
lead to better product safety performance. 
Our empirical analysis is based on an individual-level survey of product 
category/business unit perceptions of 255 NPD quality and engineering directors sampled from 
126 firms in the juvenile product sector. The results from this research, as well as its managerial 
and theoretical implications, are intended to help managers further improve product safety 
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through the design of better NPD processes and guide researchers towards better explanatory 
models about product safety and innovation. The following section includes theory development, 
key hypotheses, and an explanation of data collection methods and model analysis. After the 
discussion of the main findings, we draw conclusions and propose implications for theory and 
management practice. 
 
2.  Theory development 
2.1. Organizational culture 
Organizational culture has been researched for decades (Deal & Kenney, 1982; Hofstede, 
1997; Schein, 1992). A fundamental difference in understanding culture is whether to focus on 
the way people think or the way people behave (Cooper, 2000), and one of the most well-known 
behavior/practice definitions for organizational culture is “the way we do things around here” 
(Deal & Kenney, 1982, p. 4). Hofstede (1997, p. 182-183) concluded that “shared perceptions of 
daily practices should be considered to be the core of an organization’s culture.” 
In a comprehensive definition, Schein (1992) summarized organizational culture as a set 
of observed behavioral regularities, group norms, espoused values, formal philosophy, rules of 
the game, climate, embedded skills, habits of thinking, share meanings, and root metaphors. He 
aggregated these into three levels: 1) artifacts, 2) espoused values, and 3) underlying 
assumptions. At the surface, there are observable artifacts that one sees, hears, and feels when 
one enters an organization (e.g., organizational structures, policies, procedures, processes, 
practices, rituals, language, etc.). At the second level, there are espoused values (e.g., norms, 
ideologies, philosophies, strategies, and goals) that govern behaviors and explain why members 
behave the way they do. The third level of the hierarchy is composed of underlying assumptions, 
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such as preconscious, taken-for-granted, and invisible beliefs that determine perceptions, thought 
processes, feelings, and behaviour.  
2.2. Underlying assumptions 
Organizational culture and organizational structure are interrelated, according to Harrison 
(1972) and Handy (1976). As this paper’s purpose is to evaluate how organizational culture and 
NPD practices affect product safety performance, we map how various components of a 
company's product development system represent those artifacts, values, and assumptions as 
defined by Schein (1992). 
Top management plays a critical role in establishing company culture (Hofstede, 1997) 
and in setting the tone of product safety and establishing a safety-oriented culture (Eads & 
Reuter, 1983; Roland & Moriarty, 1983), especially through top-level commitment in all matters 
related to product safety, establishing priorities, policies and procedures, and allocating dedicated 
resources. Other indicators of safety-oriented culture can be found in the formulation of Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) and the review of safety performance and evaluation of individual 
attitudes towards safety (International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, INSAG, 1991). White 
and Pomponi (2003) found that the highest performers integrated safety, regulatory, 
environmental, and health initiatives into their corporate strategy and articulated specific goals 
for each area. Given the significant moral and legal risks for top managers, their views and 
beliefs on what constitutes a safety-oriented culture transcends all layers of an organization and 
requires full, genuine, and constant commitment by its company leaders (Ryan, 2003). We 
therefore posit that top management's commitment to safety (i.e., how product safety is 
perceived and positioned) is one of the manifestations of the underlying assumptions in 
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organizational culture in the context of product safety, and is consistent with Hofstede's (1997) 
view of top management’s involvement in defining organizational culture. 
2.3. Espoused values 
An organization's underlying assumptions give rise to what Schein (1992) called a 
company's espoused values: common beliefs shared by the members of an organization about 
“what ought to be” rather than “what is”—the domain of artifacts. Such a set of values also exists 
in the context of an organization's attitude towards product safety. A strong organizational “safety 
first” philosophy impacts members’ beliefs and attitudes towards product safety, and 
consequently, leads to its high priority and adoption of processes and practices that support the 
organization’s commitment to product safety. Moreover, this espousal of occupational health and 
safety culture has been linked to safer work behaviors (Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Varon & 
Mattila, 2000) and fewer employee injuries (Barling et al., 2002; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; 
Mearns et al., 2003; Zohar, 1980). 
The literature on product safety culture is still sparse. Svenson (1984) made one of the 
earliest contributions when he studied Volvo’s accident hazard management system and the 
general quality and product safety attitude of its technicians. Focusing on business safety 
measures in the toy industry, the European Commission (2008) echoed the importance of a 
strong quality and product safety culture. This is especially critical in design organizations 
(Rollenhagen, 2010). 
While the literature emphasizes the value of a strong product safety culture, it is unclear 
how a product safety culture influences activities and practices in NPD. Consequently, we define 
group level Product Safety Culture as product safety related beliefs, norms, and values shared by 
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the employees involved in NPD to determine how they act and react during product development 
in relation to product safety. 
2.4. Artifacts 
Artifacts are the tangible expressions of organizational culture—the technologies, 
organizational structures and functions, systems, and processes that make up an organization— 
and they are critical in the day-to-day operation of firms. In the context of product safety and 
product development, we focus on Concurrent Engineering and Design-for-Safety as key 
artifacts and processes in NPD that are both governed by espoused values and underlying 
assumptions. 
2.4.1. Concurrent engineering 
In contrast with the conventional, sequential “throw it over the wall” approach, CE 
requires all representatives from functions such as manufacturing, design, quality, and 
purchasing, including suppliers and customers, to work together simultaneously, although at 
sometimes varying degrees, throughout the NPD process (Dekkers et al., 2013). CE is 
characterized by three main components: the cross-functional team, concurrent work-flows (or 
overlap), and the early involvement of participants (Koufteros et al., 2001). 
The effect of CE on product quality is inconclusive (Koufteros et al., 2002; Koufteros & 
Marcoulides, 2006; McDonough, 2000; Ragatz et al., 2002; Rusinko, 1997; Sethi, 2000; 
Tatikonda & Montoya-Weiss, 2001). Clark and Fujimoto (1991) were among the first to 
demonstrate that CE used in incremental projects not only reduces product development cycle 
time but also decreases product quality. However, Rusinko (1997) described a positive effect on 
product quality by both organizational-level and group-level design-manufacturing integration, 
and McDonough (2000) found the use of cross-functional teams significantly related to team 
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performance, including developing high quality products. Tatikonda and Montoya-Weiss (2001) 
showed that process concurrency, formality, and adaptability (all of them organizational process 
factors) have a positive effect on product quality, cost, and time-to-market. 
Regarding the effects of CE on product safety, scholars and practitioners alike suggest 
that safety engineers should be involved in product design as early as possible and recommend 
using CE (Dowlatshahi, 2001; Wang & Ruxton, 1997; Rausand & Utne, 2008). However, the 
analytical and empirical evidence for this claim is still weak primarily because product safety has 
never been examined as a standalone variable. Even if product safety is included as one aspect of 
product quality, the literature is inconclusive on whether a positive relationship exists between 
product quality and CE. For instance, Sethi (2000) revealed that quality is positively influenced 
by information integration in the team, customers’ influence on product development process, 
and quality orientation in the firm, but it is negatively affected by the innovativeness of the 
product. Sethi did not find functional diversity to have any effect on product quality. Measuring 
product quality in terms of function, safety, reliability, durability and performance, Koufteros et 
al. (2001) found that CE has a positive direct relationship with product innovation, but they did 
not find any significant direct relationship between CE and quality. In a later paper focusing on 
NPD practices, Koufteros et al. (2002) reported CE has a positive impact on quality, a result that 
Koufteros and Marcoulides (2006) qualified by demonstrating that this effect is mediated by high 
versus low cellular manufacturing environments.  
Thus, although the literature on the interrelationship of CE, product quality and NPD is 
growing, the impact of CE on product safety has not been evaluated empirically. 
2.4.2. Design-for-Safety 
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NPD systems and processes are the primary tools to implement product-oriented safety 
culture and innovation. A well-defined, high-quality NPD process is generally recognized as a 
critical success factor for product success (Cooper et al., 2004; Montoya-Weiss & Calantone, 
1994) and product quality (Calantone & Benedetto, 1988; Millson & Wilemon, 2008; Song et al., 
1997). However, whether the use of certain technical activities and methodologies in the NPD 
process affects product quality positively is less clear. According to Calantone and Benedetto 
(1988), product quality is influenced by technical activities such as preliminary engineering, 
technical and manufacturing review, prototyping, in-house product testing and trial production, 
and, as Millson and Wilemon (2008) asserted, especially by technical activities in the early 
stages of the NPD process. Fynes and De Búrca (2005) found that design quality has an impact 
on conformance quality, product cost, external quality-in-use, and time-to-market. However, 
Song et al. (1997) did not find any significant direct relationship between technical proficiency 
and product quality.  
DFS encompasses the procedures, methodologies, and practices that a company 
implements in NPD to manage product safety, with a focus on the technical and engineering 
aspects such as safety factors, hazard analysis, and safety management tools. DFS studies have 
increased given a large percentage of accidents and incidents are rooted in design (Kinnersley & 
Roelen, 2007). Although there is substantial support for methodologies integrating safety into the 
design process (Drogoul et al., 2007; Fadier and De la Garza, 2006; Hasan et al., 2003; Rausand 
& Utne, 2008; Schulte et al., 2008), the challenge is to identify all the relevant hazards given the 
increasing complexity of technology, products, and systems and to meet the safety objective 
under the trade-off decision between cost, schedule, and performance (Rausand & Utne, 2008). 
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The effective use of safety management tools, such as Faulty Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA), and Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) is important in 
managing integration in the NPD process (Abbott & Tyler, 1997; Nelson & Eubanks, 2005). 
Riswadkar (2000) also pointed out that Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP), a 
systematic approach to food safety, can be applied to other products and processes. However, 
most design engineers do not receive formal training in safety methodologies (such as FTA and 
FMEA) common to the safety community, and many product safety tools are not systematically 
implemented by the design community (Main & Frantz, 1994; Main & McMurphy, 1998). Safety 
management tools and DFS are considered important, but the effectiveness of hazard analysis is 
still unclear (Marucheck et al., 2011). 
Even though the literature has identified a high quality NPD process as a key success 
factor for NPD, its implications for product safety remain unknown at best because safety 
management methodologies and product safety performance are not well understood. A thorough 
conceptual understanding of how Design-for-Safety practices affect product safety (rather than 
just product quality) is still largely missing. 
2.5. Product safety performance 
Following Daughety and Reinganum (1995) and the European Union Directive 
2001/95/EU Article 2(b), product safety has been defined as whether the operation or use of a 
product under normal or reasonably foreseeable condition of use, including duration, involves 
risk of injury or damage to health of users or damage to property or environment. A product is 
considered safe if the risk involved is considered acceptable and consistent with a high level of 
protection for the health and safety of consumers. 
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In most cases, product safety performance information is confidential and not available to 
the public, and it has been measured in diverse ways in different studies depending on the 
availability of data, e.g. using recall rates for consumer products (White & Pomponi, 2003) or 
accident and incident rates in the airline industry (Rose, 1990). Measuring product safety 
performance is difficult because objective accident data are insufficiently sensitive, of dubious 
accuracy, retrospective, ignore risk exposure (Glendon & Litherland, 2001), and tend to be very 
unstable (DeJoy et al., 2004; Havold, 2005). 
In conclusion, we assign the following concepts to parameters as follows: 
1. Management Commitment to Safety, respectively, “safety first,” is an underlying 
assumption in organizational culture. We study its effect on espoused values. 
2. Product Safety Culture is part of espoused values (i.e., the firm’s values, beliefs, 
perceptions, and attitudes towards product safety). We study product safety culture at 
the level of NPD, with variables addressing issues such as whether the NPD team 
members consider product safety more important than cost and schedule, whether 
the product safety review team is independent from NPD engineers, and whether 
NPD engineers understand safety requirements and consider these requirements in 
their daily work. We expect effects on visible artifacts in NPD. 
3. We consider NPD practices such as Concurrent Engineering and Design-for-Safety 
as visible artifacts. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
The importance of visionary leadership and top management on firm culture, activities, 
and performance is well established (Hofstede, 1997; Ogbonna & Harris, 2000; Schein 1992). 
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Although many activities critical to product safety (such as CE, DFS, and also more generally, 
NPD processes and strategies) are not part of top management’s primary responsibility, 
management commitment directly and indirectly influences attitudes and process (in 
organizational culture terminology: values and artifacts) that promote a positive safety-oriented 
culture using specific safety-inducing incentives (Eads & Reuter, 1983; Roland & Moriarty, 1983; 
White & Pomponi, 2003), and lead to higher product safety performance. The extent to which 
top management supports quality affects management perceptions (Bensen et al., 1991), and 
product safety performance is higher in firms with a product safety strategy with demonstrated 
senior leadership and a commitment of resources to implement safety, regulatory, environmental, 
and health management practices (White & Pomponi, 2003). 
What is still unclear, however, is how many of these product-safety oriented values and 
artifacts influence each other in mediating the overall influence of top management commitment 
on product safety performance. Much of the established literature on these important links is 
anecdotal or prescriptive, and there is little empirical research on how management commitment 
to safety translates into practices and affects product safety.  
Management commitment to safety and management’s role in establishing a product 
safety culture are also important for NPD more directly affecting product safety. DFS and CE 
strengthen operational product innovation efficiency, but they also create well-tested and safe 
products (Dowlatshahi, 2001; Rausand & Utne, 2008; Wang & Ruxton, 1997). DFS’s specific 
focus on safety and CE’s shared intra-functional design practices should encourage management 
to commit resources and implement well-defined NPD techniques with more predictable 
outcomes. However, management’s ability to establish any of these attributes of organizational 
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culture (Garvin, 1987; Schein, 1992) may vary significantly between the two direct NPD 
artifacts of DFS and CE. In summary, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: Management Commitment to Safety has a positive effect on Product Safety Culture in NPD. 
H2: Management Commitment to Safety has a positive effect on Concurrent Engineering. 
H3: Management Commitment to Safety has a positive effect on Design-for-Safety. 
 
Safety culture, safe work behaviors, and safety performance have received scholarly 
attention since the term safety culture first appeared in the 1987 OECD Nuclear Agency report 
(INSAG, 1988). However, most research focused on occupational health and safety; only a 
handful of studies looked at product safety culture. In an example of early research, Svenson 
(1984) identified employees’ positive safety attitudes as a critical success factor of accident 
hazard management systems. Van Vuuren (2000) found safety culture had a considerable impact 
on both incident causation and risk management and concluded the traditional focus on human 
and technological failure should be replaced by a comprehensive approach that includes 
organizational and cultural precursors. Similarly, White and Pomponi (2003) found firms with a 
safety-oriented culture had better product safety performance, an insight echoed by a report by 
the European Commission (2008), which stated that a strong quality and safety culture were a 
critical element in ensuring continuous attention to product safety issues. 
A strong product safety culture in NPD centers more on safety methodologies (such as 
hazard analysis, FMEA) and better executed or more disciplined NPD and CE processes, which 
may lead to excessive risk aversion, passed down to NPD via stricter tolerances and safer work 
practices, which result in safe but also less differentiated products. The new products might meet 
minimal innovation specifications and safety criteria, so perfect safety may only be achievable 
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through absolute reliance on standard rather than novel solutions and through expensive zero-
fault testing. However, this approach is not always economically viable for firms; internal 
mechanisms and processes such as CE and DFS are intermediary instruments to achieve 
predictable product success, of which product safety is a component outcome. Those firm values 
supporting a culture favoring product safety also have an effect on NPD techniques, such as CE 
and DFS, which leads to the proposition of the following hypotheses: 
H4: Product Safety Culture in NPD has a positive effect on Concurrent Engineering. 
H5: Product Safety Culture in NPD has a positive effect on Design-for-Safety. 
 
CE techniques are used not only to speed up innovation and NPD but also require 
otherwise separate teams (for different functions, disciplines, or components) to coordinate 
themselves better, communicate product and process-related issues, and address problems 
relating to product safety performance promptly. CE interaction regarding product design 
questions are bound to address safety concerns; however, in the multi-functional context of CE, 
these issues should receive more rounded and integrated consideration, and if so, we would 
expect DFS to improve with greater emphasis of CE in NPD. Hence, we propose the following 
hypotheses: 
H6: Concurrent Engineering has a positive effect on Design-for-Safety. 
H7: Concurrent Engineering has a positive effect on Product Safety Performance. 
 
Design-for-Safety encompasses the NPD process and the safety management tools and 
methodologies used in new product development, and it has a positive causal relationship with 
product quality (Calantone & Benedetto, 1988; Millson & Wilemon, 2008; Song & Parry, 1997). 
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Safety practitioners have suggested that the issue of product safety should be addressed in 
parallel with the design process; however, much of the literature lacks an integrated view of 
product safety management methodologies and tools in the NPD process. 
While it seems self-evident that safety-oriented NPD activities should lead to greater 
product quality, the individual components constituting the artifacts of safety orientation and the 
direct consequence of product safety performance (rather than the more generic product quality) 
could still benefit from disentanglement. Hence, in parallel to hypothesis 7, we propose: 
H8: Design-for-Safety has a positive effect on Product Safety Performance. 
Figure 1 displays the resulting research framework. 
 
Figure 1. Research framework 
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4.  Research methodology 
4.1. Data collection 
Our empirical study uses a sample of primary data that was collected from senior quality 
and innovation managers who have intimate knowledge about product development and safety 
performance of their company’s products in the toy and juvenile products industry. One of the 
authors was kindly granted access by the China Toy and Juvenile Products Association (TJPA) to 
interview and collect data via a pre-defined survey at two of the largest industry-wide 
conferences organized by TJPA in Beijing (September 2008) and Hangzhou (October 2008). 
Attendees at this conference represented companies selling about 85% of all toys and juvenile 
products sold worldwide, either through Chinese domestic manufacturers or foreign 
multinational companies (European Commission, 2008). In this setting, we had detailed 
structured research interviews with 40 managers from 33 companies. All interviews were 
recorded in writing, and feedback on the minutes was solicited from the interviewees. All the 
records were anonymized for later analysis, a precondition which allowed us to discuss 
confidential and sometimes sensitive aspects of product quality and innovation. Using a global 
directory of toy manufacturers, we sent the same questionnaire to juvenile product manufacturers 
outside China, and 31 usable responses were returned. 
In total, we received 255 usable responses from 126 firms in the two surveys. Table 1 
shows the demographics of the survey sample by respondents and firms. All of the 255 managers 
responding via the survey had senior product development or quality management roles. The 
companies’ sales revenues for the target period ranged from $5 million to $5.9 billion, totaling up 
to $11 billion, or 43% of global sales in the industry in 2008. Among these firms, 36 were fully 
owned foreign firms from the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, and 90 
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firms were either local Chinese firms or joint ventures. As China has a 70% share of the 
worldwide toy trade (TJPA website), the return rates between China-based and international 
firms are comparable. 
To ensure the comparability of the survey data used in this analysis, several preliminary 
tests of significance were carried out using MANOVA with the five constructs (MCS, PSC, CE, 
DFS and PSP) as dependent variables and respondent manager type, firm size, country, and 
survey time as categorical independent variables. There were no significant mean differences of 
the five constructs by respondent manager type, country, and survey time. We checked for 
consistency of the responses by company or group, and observed no significant differences. 
 
Table 1: Demographics of the sample: 255 respondents from 126 firms 
Respondents Position of respondents No. of responses (%) 
 Quality manager/director, senior quality engineer  201 (78.8%) 
 Engineering manager/director 30 (11.8%) 
 Product managers 8 (3.1%) 
 GM/VP 16 (6.3%) 
 Total 255 (100%) 
   
Firm size N = No. of employees  No. of responses (%) 
 N <500 29 (11.4%) 
 5000>N>= 500 123 (48.2%) 
 N>5000 103 (40.4%) 
R&D intensity R = Ratio of R&D expenses/sales No. of responses (%) 
 R< 3% 116 (45.5%) 
 R>= 3% 139 (54.5%) 
Firm ownership Location No. of firms (%) 
 Chinese firms or JV in China 90 (71.4%) 
 Overseas firms located in USA, EU, JP, NL, AU 36 (28.6%) 
 Total 126 (100%) 
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4.2. The survey instrument 
The study’s survey instrument was developed through extensive review of published 
questions in prior literature and feedback on initial versions of the survey from selected 
practitioners. The survey covers questions for the five constructs in the conceptual model and 
background information about the companies (see Table 2 for survey questions). Adequate 
constructs for product safety management were lacking, so we adapted those from the major 
quality management dimensions identified by Saraph et al. (1989) with modification from 
“quality” to “product safety.” In the CE and DFS sections, we incorporated relevant NPD 
practices identified by Cooper et al. (2004) and Koufteros et al. (2006). We also included safety 
management tools in NPD and solicited feedback from additional experts in the industry for 
validating our survey instrument. Product safety performance is measured both from the internal 
perspective (i.e., how product safety satisfies the company’s internal requirements) as the 
outgoing product audit results by the company, and the external perspective as the customer’s 
assessment or satisfaction with product safety performance. Third-party independent data such as 
accident/death rate and recall numbers were not available at this level. 
A professional translator translated the original English survey questionnaire from 
English to Chinese, and another translator translated it back from Chinese to English. One of the 
paper’s authors is bilingual in Chinese and English and verified the translation with minor 
changes to the questionnaire. A pilot survey was carried out with respondents from 22 juvenile 
product firms in Jiangsu province, China. Based on the pilot data and suggestions from experts in 
the industry, some items were removed from the initial survey. 
The data collected are self-reported and represent the managers’ perceptions within their 
product category or business unit. Respondents were required to rate the predictor variables on a 
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five-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = to a great extent) and dependent variables (product 
safety performance) between 1 and 10 (where 1 = strongly dissatisfied, 6 = acceptable, 10 = 
strongly satisfied). When the measures of predictors and criteria variables are rated by the same 
respondent, common method bias might exist. To address this problem, we followed 
recommendations by Podsakoff et al. (2003): 
1) Application of all procedural remedies for questionnaire design; 
2) Separation of criterion and predictor variables proximally and psychologically, with 
criterion and predictor variables on different pages; 
3) Response anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed during the survey; 
4) Different scaling formats for the independent variables and dependent variables in the 
survey. 
In the single-factor analysis for independent and dependent variables, 17 factors accounted for 
85% of variance yielded and factor #1 accounted for 39% of variance. Since neither a single 
factor nor a general factor accounted for the majority of covariance in the measure, common 
method bias is unlikely to be an issue in the data (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  Table 2 shows the 
CFA factor loading estimates and t-values. 
 
Table 2: CFA factor loading estimates and t-value (n=255) 
Code Questions/Construct loading t-value 
MCS Top Management Commitment to Safety (latent variable)   
TM1 Extent to which the top management assumes responsibility for product safety performance   
TM2 Degree to which top management supports product safety management .69 _a 
TM3 Extent to which relevant department heads are evaluated on product safety performance .75 10.97 
TM4 Degree to which management participates in product safety improvement .80 11.70 
TM5 Degree to which management establishes product safety policies and objectives .78 11.44 
TM6 Specificity of firm’s product safety policies and objectives .81 11.71 
TM7 Importance attached to product safety in relation to cost and schedule by top management .79 11.51 
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TM8 Amount of review for product safety issues in top management review meetings .71 10.39 
PSC Product Safety Culture (latent variable)   
PSC1 
Degree to which NPD engineers are familiar with relevant product safety standards and 
regulatory requirements 
.76 
_a 
PSC2 Product safety is more important than cost and schedule in NPD process .68 10.59 
PSC3 Product safety review team independent of NPD project team conducts product safety review  .73 11.15 
PSC4 Product safety review team has the authority to stop or postpone the NPD project .72 10.94 
PSC5 Degree to which product safety is considered by NPD engineers in NPD process .81 11.30 
CE Concurrent Engineering (latent variable)   
CE1 Cross functional teams are used in NPD process .62 _a 
CE2 
NPD project team leader and members remain on the project from beginning to end and not 
just for a short while or a single phase 
.83 
7.59 
CE3 The NPD teams are accountable for their project’s end results .86 7.81 
CE4 NPD team members share information via a central information system .73 6.83 
CE5 Customer is involved in NPD process   
CE6 Degree to which major suppliers are involved in the NPD process .61 6.85 
CE7 Degree to which product manufacturability is considered by design engineers during NPD .65 7.04 
DFS Design-for-Safety (latent variable)   
NPP1 
A systematic NPD process (such as stage-gate, from idea generation, feasibility study, 
prototyping, pilot run, to mass production) is implemented 
.72 
_a 
NPP2 
The firm has clearly defined requirements for product safety and verification plan at each 
stage in the NPD process 
.75 
11.68 
NPP3 
Degree to which comprehensive product safety tests and reliability tests (internal or external) 
are carried out before product launch for production 
.66 
9.81 
NPP4 
Degree to which comprehensive product safety reviews (including hazard analysis and 
foreseeable misuse/abuse analysis) are carried out before product launch for production 
.78 
11.86 
NPP5 In NPD process, FMEA (Failure Mode Effect Analysis) is carried out for risk analysis .63 10.87 
NPP6 
Degree to which field test/consumer use are carried out before product launch for 
production 
 
 
NPP7 Design reviews are carried out before new product launch .71 9.53 
NPP8 Degree to which post launch reviews are carried out systematically   
PSP Product Safety Performance (latent variable)   
PSP1 In outgoing product audit, firm’s assessment on product safety performance is: .83 _a 
PSP2 Customers’ assessment on firm’s product safety performance in the market is: .73 8.54 
Note: Items underlined (TM1, CE5, NPP6, NPP8) were deleted in the analysis due to poor model fit; a=not estimated 
when loading set to fixed value of 1.0; Model fit indices after deleting the four items: P <0.001, χ2=2570.33, df= 291, 
χ2/df=1.96, RMSEA = 0.06, CFI=0.92, IFI=0.92, TLI=0.90, AIC =742.33, saturated AIC =754.00, independent AIC = 3691.20. 
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4.3. Model analysis 
We applied a two-step approach to formulate and test the model (Hair et al., 2010; 
Koufteros & Marcoulides, 2006), meaning that the measurement model is tested prior to the 
testing of the structural model to avoid possible interactions between measurement and structural 
models. In addition, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was performed on the entire set of items 
simultaneously (Anderson et al., 1987). SPSS 18 and AMOS 18 were used for data analysis. 
The initial measurement model with the instrument of 30 items indicated an inadequate 
model fit. Model fit was improved for the measurement model through iteration of standard CFA 
refinement procedures (Hair et al., 2010). A good model fit was achieved after reducing the scale 
items from 30 to 26 in the five constructs (see Table 2). The items deleted include TM1 from 
MCS, CE5 from CE and NPP6 and NPP8 from DFS. Before each deletion, the specific item and 
its relevant construct were reviewed to ensure the integrity of the construct.  
The fit indices used to evaluate the structural model are relative chi-square (the ratio of 
chi-square to degree of freedom, CMIN/DF), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Incremental Fit Index 
(IFI), Tucker and Lewis Index (TLI), Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC), and Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). These indices were applied in view of their 
widespread use in model fit assessment (Hair et al., 2010; Marcoulides & Hershberger, 1997). 
Detailed criteria for analyzing model fit with these fit indices can be found in Byrne (1998), Hair 
et al. (2010), Hu and Bentler (1999), and Raykov and Marcoulides (2000). Relative chi-square 
values less than 3.0 imply an acceptable fit, and less than 2.0 is considered very good (Carmines 
and McIver, 1981). Browne and Cudeck (1993) suggested that RMSEA values of 0.08 or less 
indicate a reasonable model fit, and values less than 0.05 imply a good model fit. As a rule of 
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thumb, values of CFI, IFI, and TLI close to 1 (e.g. >0.9) indicate a very good model fit (Raykov 
& Marcoulides, 2000).  
Content validity was ensured through a comprehensive literature review and a detailed 
evaluation by professionals from industry and academia. Most of the practices adapted in this 
research were tested in previous literature (Cooper et al., 2004; Koufteros et al., 2001; Saraph et 
al., 1989). Moreover, criterion-related validity (also called predictive validity or external validity) 
was verified through correlations between the factor scores for each construct (Nunnally, 1978) 
(see Table 3). 
Table 2 shows the CFA factor loading estimates and t-values, which indicate that all 
factor loadings are highly significant as required for convergent validity, i.e. the extent to which 
the indicators of a construct share a high proportion of variance (Hair et. al., 2010), and can be 
assessed by means of factor loadings through t-tests (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). There is good 
construct validity if the standardized factor loadings are over 0.5 (ideally, 0.7 or higher) and 
significant at a confidence level of 95%, which requires t-values over 1.96. An alternative to 
evaluate convergent validity is through Average Variance Extracted (AVE), in which values of 
0.5 or higher indicate adequate convergence. Convergent validity of our measurement model 
were supported with all AVE exceeding the guideline of 50% (see Table 3). 
The construct reliability estimates and reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s Alpha) are 
calculated to assess the reliability of the constructs (see Table 3). It ranges from 0.615 for PSP to 
0.913 for MCS, thereby exceeding the minimum guideline of 0.6. Additionally, the reliability 
coefficient (Cronbach’s Alpha) for all the scales ranges from 0.754 to 0.911 (refer to Table 3). 
Traditionally, reliability coefficients of 0.70 or higher are considered satisfactory (Nunnally 
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1978); therefore, the scales are judged to be reliable. In sum, the above calculations offer strong 
support for the convergent validity of the measurement model.  
Discriminant validity indicates the extent to which a construct is truly distinct from other 
constructs both in terms of how much it correlates with other constructs and how distinctly 
measured variables represent only this single construct (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Hair et al., 2010). 
Therefore, high scale correlations warrant a careful discriminant validity assessment for the 
constructs. First, discriminant validity was verified with Anderson and Gerbing’s (1988) 
methodology with 1 not included in any of the confidence intervals for the constructs (see Table 
3). Second, statistically different constructs exhibit interscale correlations that are adequately 
different from 1 (Bagozzi et al., 1991), which is the case in our constructs. The Cronbach 
reliability coefficients and average interscale correlations are presented in Table 3 and show that 
the Cronbach reliability coefficient for each construct is larger than its corresponding average 
interscale correlations. Hence, the model also passes the test of discriminant validity (Ghiselli et 
al., 1981).  
Multiple group analysis is a structural equation modeling (SEM) framework to test 
differences between similar models for different group of respondents (Hair et al., 2010). To 
evaluate whether R&D intensity moderates the relationship in the proposed model, multi-group 
analysis was performed by splitting the sample between respondents representing firms reporting 
high and low levels of R&D intensity (calculated as the ratio of R&D expenses to sales). 
Respondents from firms with a ratio of less than 3% are classified as Group A (n = 116), and 
respondents from firms with a ratio equal to or above 3% are categorized as Group B (n = 139). 
Applying methods used by Byrne (1998), Hair et al. (2010), Koufteros et al. (2006), Schumacker 
and Marcoulides (1998), we verified measurement invariance (or measurement equivalence), a 
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step that is considered a prerequisite prior to assessing invariance for individual path coefficients. 
We selected the two-group methodology because Ahire et al. (2000), Calantone et al. (2003), and 
Koufteros et al. (2006) demonstrated in similar studies that this device is more appropriate to 
evaluate moderator effect compared to an approach in which environmental effects are posited as 
direct effects. Appendix A presents a six-stage procedure proposed by Hair et al. (2010) for 
conducting a multi-group analysis.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, correlations, Cronbach’s α 
 Mean SD α AVIC MCS PSC CE DFS PSP 
Management 
Commitment to Safety 
26.94 5.55 .911 .632 1.00     
Product Safety Culture 18.68 3.86 .842 .748 .71* 
.63-.79Δ 
1.00    
Concurrent Engineering 21.91 4.26 .834 .672 .55* 
.45-.65 
.84* 
.72-.96 
1.00   
Design-for-Safety 32.79 4.33 .848 .765 .77* 
.67-.87 
.86* 
.76-.96 
.77* 
.63-.91 
1.00  
Product Safety 
Performance 
14.97 2.51 .754 .568 .50* 
.38-.62 
.58* 
.44-.72 
.53* 
.37-.69 
.66* 
.50-.84 
1.00 
Construct Validity (%)     58.0 54.8 52.7 50.8 61 
Average Variance 
Extracted 
    0.913 0.849 0.855 0.865 0.615 
Note: AVIC = Average Interscale Correlations; Δ: confidence interval for constructs. 
         * Correlation is significant at p < 0.001 level (two-tailed) 
 
4.4. Structural model and hypothesis testing 
As the measurement model showed a good model fit with construct validity and 
reliability, we proceeded to test the hypotheses with path estimates and t-values. The model fit 
indices (CMIN/DF, CFI, IFI, TLI, and RMSEA) were calculated and evaluated. As the model fits 
the data adequately, the t-values of the structural coefficients were used to test the hypotheses. 
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The outputs of the standardized regression weights from the SEM analysis are presented in 
Figure 2. A significance level of 0.05 was used to test the hypotheses. The main advantage of 
SEM analysis over conventional regression is its ability to decompose the observed empirical 
correlation or covariance between any two variables into three components: direct, indirect, and 
unexplained effects (Land, 1969). The decomposed path model effects are shown in Table 4. 
Figure 2. Structural model 
 
Note: Std. regression weight/t value/p value 
Model fit indices: CMIN/DF = 1.96, CFI = .92, IFI = .92, TLI = .90, RMSEA = 0.06. R square values: Product Safety 
Culture (0.51), Concurrent Engineering (0.71), Design-for-Safety (0.81), Product Safety Performance (0.43). 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 propose that management commitment to safety has a positive effect 
on product safety culture and Design-for-Safety, respectively. These two hypotheses were 
supported. Hypothesis 2 states that management commitment to safety has a positive effect on 
CE. This hypothesis was not supported because the p value is 0.25. There was no significant 
effect between management commitment to safety and CE. Not only was the relationship 
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insignificant, the effect was also negative. Hypotheses 4 and 5 propose that product safety 
culture in NPD has a positive effect on CE and Design-for-Safety, respectively. The results 
support that a higher level of product safety culture was related to a higher level of Concurrent 
Engineering (p<0.001, C.R. = 6.26) and Design-for-Safety (p<0.01, C.R. = 3.16). Hypotheses 6 
and 7 predict that CE has a positive effect on Design-for-Safety and product safety performance, 
respectively. With p values of 0.08 and 0.64, respectively, hypotheses 6 and 7 were not supported 
at a significance level of 0.05. Therefore, CE does not have significant impact on Design-for-
Safety and product safety performance. Hypothesis 8 proposes that Design-for-Safety has a 
positive effect on product safety performance. A variance of 61% for product safety performance 
was explained by Design-for-Safety, and this hypothesis was supported with p value of less than 
0.001 and a C.R. of 4.68.  
Table 4: Summary of effects in the structural model 
 Direct 
effect 
Indirect 
effect 
Total 
effect 
Correlation Std. direct 
effect 
Std. indirect 
effect 
Std. total effect 
PSC        
Effect of MCS .71 .00 .71 .71 .71 .00 .71 
CE        
Effect of MCS -.12 .78 .66 .55 -.10 .65 .55 
Effect of PSC 1.10 .00 1.10 .84 .91 .00 .91 
DFS        
Effect of MCS .36 .49 .86 .77 .32 .45 .77 
Effect of PSC .51 .21 .73 .86 .46 .19 .65 
Effect of CE .19 .00 .19 .77 .21 .00 .21 
PSP        
Effect of MCS .00 .96 .96 .50 .00 .50 .50 
Effect of PSC .00 .87 .87 .58 .00 .45 .45 
Effect of CE .10 .20 .30 .53 .06 .13 .19 
Effect of DFS 1.05 .00 1.05 .66 .61 .00 .61 
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4.5. Testing for moderating impact of R&D intensity 
Although five out of the eight hypotheses were supported, it is unclear if the relationships 
hold across different environments. For example, do the model relationships vary across firms 
with low and high R&D intensity? Adequate funding is a critical input to the NPD process and 
product safety management. Therefore, it is worthwhile to evaluate whether the hypothesized 
relationships are moderated by R&D intensity. The relationship between R&D intensity and firm 
or innovation performance has been empirically researched by Deeds (2001), Greve (2003), and 
Parthasarthy and Hammond (2002) with inconsistent results. Stock et al. (2001) found an 
inverted-U relationship between R&D intensity and NPD performance, and Bougrain and 
Haudeville (2002) claimed that R&D intensity does not influence the future prospects of a 
project. Still, high levels of R&D intensity are not necessarily linked to good innovation practice: 
they may simply mask process inefficiencies (Cebon & Newton, 1999; Dodgson & Hinze, 2000). 
Whatever the reasons, the resources available for managing NPD processes and product safety 
are different for firms with low and high R&D intensity; hence, we decided to determine whether 
the investigated relationships are different in firms with high R&D intensity compared to those 
with low R&D intensity. 
We follow the approach of Hair et al. (2010) in testing the moderating effect of R&D 
intensity on the relationships in the model. The first stage verifies configural invariance, i.e. the 
same basic factor structure exists in all of the groups. This model is a totally free multiple group 
model (Model 1 or TF model) as all free parameters are estimated separately and are therefore 
free to take on different values in each group. No equality constraints are specified across groups. 
The TF model becomes the baseline model for comparison. The appropriateness of the posited 
structure depends on the overall or aggregate model fit. The second stage is to form groups based 
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on a particular characteristic of interest and test metric invariance. Since we examine R&D 
intensity, we form groups based on the ratio of R&D expenses to sales. Firms with a ratio less 
than 3% are classified as Group A (n = 116); whereas, firms with a ratio equal to or above 3% 
are categorized as Group B (n = 139). We impose equality constraints on factor loadings for the 
observed dependent and independent variables across groups (Model 2). This is a critical test of 
invariance, and the degree to which this is met determines cross-group validity beyond the basic 
factor structure. A chi-square (χ2) difference between Model 1 and Model 2 indicates whether 
the loadings are invariant across the two groups. When measurement invariance is established, 
the structural model estimate is evaluated for moderation by a comparison of group models. The 
TF model is estimated with path estimates calculated separately for both groups. The χ2 
difference test is conducted when the path estimates are constrained to be equal. If the models 
are statistically significant after constraining the path estimates, moderating effects exist.   
Table 5 shows the results of the measurement invariance tests based on the above 
procedure. Configural invariance was verified as the separate models for respondents from low 
and high R&D intensity firms both exhibited an acceptable level of model fit (χ2/df<2.0, 
RMSEA = 0.06, CFI = 0.86). Model 1 was compared to Model 2 and the chi-square difference is 
24.17 with 21 degree of freedom and a p value of 0.29, which is not statistically significant. Thus, 
the two models exhibit full metric invariance, which means that the same five factors and factor 
loadings for specific items measuring each factor are invariant for respondents from low and 
high R&D intensity firms. 
Table 5: Measurement invariance tests for low and high R&D intensity 
Model tested χ2 df χ2/df RMSEA CFI Δdf Δχ2 p 
Unconstrained 
(model 1) 
1043.77 578 1.81 .06 .86    
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Measurement weights 
(model 2) 
1067.94 599 1.78 .06 .86 21 24.17 .29 
 
We applied the same procedure in setting up a two-group structural model to specify the 
two-group CFA model testing for differences according to R&D intensity. The unconstrained TF 
model estimates an identical structural model in both groups simultaneously, and the second 
group model is estimated by constraining the eight construct paths to be equal in both groups. 
The fit indices and path estimates are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Both models indicate an 
acceptable model fit. The chi-square difference was 2.78 with 8 degrees of freedom, which is 
statistically insignificant, with a p value of 0.95. This means that R&D intensity does not 
moderate the relationship in the structural model; therefore, the hypothesis that R&D intensity 
mattered was rejected. The path model relationships are invariant across firms with low and high 
levels of R&D intensity. 
 
Table 6: Testing for R&D intensity as a moderator in the structural model 
Model tested χ2 df χ2/df RMSEA CFI Δχ2 Δdf p 
Unconstrained  1043.87 582 1.79 .06 .87    
Equality of path estimates  1046.66 590 1.77 .06 .87 2.78 8 .95 
 
Table 7: Path estimates for constrained and unconstrained models  
  Unconstrained    Constrained  
Path P(a) Estimates(a) P (b) Estimates(b) p Estimate(a) Estimate(b) 
MCS->PSC *** .64 *** .77 *** .64 .77 
MCS->CE .32 -.12 .52 -.09 .23 -.10 -.12 
PSC->CE *** .92 *** .88 *** .90 .91 
MCS->DFS .02 .26 *** .40 *** .30 .35 
PSC->DFS .04 .47 .01 .46 *** .49 .48 
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CE->DFS .18 .26 .25 .15 .08 .19 .19 
CE->PSP .94 .02 .49 .12 .58 .08 .06 
DFS->PSP *** .72 .00 .50 *** .65 .56 
 
We also used Doll et al. (1998) to test for multi-group invariance. A two-group model with 
equality constraints imposed for each path coefficient across the groups was executed, and the 
chi-square value was recorded. Next, the equality constraints for the path coefficients were 
relaxed one at a time. Chi-square difference was used to check for statistical significance. The 
results (Table 8) show that none of the path coefficients were statistically significant across the 
groups with low and high R&D intensity. The results are in line with those obtained with the 
approach previously reported.  
Table 8: Testing for moderating effect of R&D intensity in the structural model 
Model tested χ2 df χ2/df RMSEA CFI Δχ2 Δdf p 
Constrained model (all invariance) 1136.52 634 1.79 .06 .84    
MCS->DFS (path invariance relaxed) 1137.58 635 1.79 .06 .85 1.06 1 .30 
MCS->CE (path invariance relaxed) 1136.52 635 1.79 .06 .85 .00 1 .99 
PSC->DFS (path invariance relaxed) 1137.53 635 1.79 .06 .84 .01 1 .93 
MCS->PSC (path invariance relaxed) 1139.32 635 1.79 .06 .84 2.8 1 .09 
PSC->CE (path invariance relaxed) 1136.84 635 1.79 .06 .84 .32 1 .57 
CE->PSP (path invariance relaxed) 1136.81 635 1.79 .06 .84 .30 1 .59 
DFS->PSP (path invariance relaxed) 1137.66 635 1.79 .06 .84 1.16 1 .28 
CE->DFS (path invariance relaxed) 1137.17 635 1.79 .06 .84 .66 1 .42 
 
4.6. The mediating effect of DFS on CE and PSP 
Since the insignificant relationship between Concurrent Engineering and product safety 
performance seems contradictory to the literature, the mediating effect of DFS on CE and PSP 
deserves thorough evaluation. If the relationship between two constructs remains significant and 
unchanged once a third construct is introduced into the model as an additional predictor, a 
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mediating effect does not exist (Hair et al., 2010). If the effect is reduced but remains significant 
after a third construct is added as a predictor, partial mediation is supported. If the effect is 
reduced to a point where it is not statistically significant after a third construct is included as an 
additional predictor, full mediation is supported. In order to evaluate the mediating effect of DFS 
between CE and PSP, we first verify that all three constructs were significantly correlated (see 
Table 3). In the next step we estimate the model without DFS presented. The model fit indices 
showed a good fit with normed Chi-square =1.88, CFI = .94, and RMSEA = 0.06 (see Table 9). 
The path between CE and PSP also showed a significant relationship with C.R. of 5.79 (p < 
0.001 level), with a direct effect of 0.57. The model was then estimated again by adding DFS to 
the model as a mediator between CE and PSP. The model fit indices changed slightly but still 
showed a good fit between the model and the data, with normed Chi-square = 1.96, CFI = 0.92, 
and RMSEA = 0.06. The path between CE and PSP was no longer significant after introducing 
the mediating construct DFS, and the standardized regression weight dropped from 0.57 to 0.06 
(total effect 0.19, indirect effect 0.13). Consequently, the full mediating effect of DFS on the 
relationship between CE and PSP was supported, meaning CE influences PSP through the 
mediator DFS. This explains why the direct relationship between CE and PSP is not significant 
in the structural model. 
 
Table 9: Testing for mediation in the structural model 
Model Element Model without DFS Model with DFS 
Model fit   
χ2 (chi-square) 312.34 570.33 
df (degree of freedom) 166 291 
χ2/df 1.88 1.96 
Probability 0.00 0.00 
RMSEA 0.06 0.06 
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CFI 0.94 0.92 
Standardized parameter estimates   
MCS->PSC 0.71* 0.71* 
MCS->CE -0.08 -0.10 
PSC->CE 0.91* 0.91* 
MCS->DFS  0.32* 
PSC->DFS  0.46* 
CE->DFS  0.21** 
CE->PSP 0.57* 0.06 
DFS->PSP  0.61* 
*: significant at 0.01 level; **: significant at 0.1 level. 
 
5.  Discussion 
The results of SEM analysis indicate that management commitment to safety has a great 
impact on product safety culture and Design-for-Safety (with an indirect coefficient of 0.5, the 
strong indirect effect between management commitment to safety and product safety 
performance is apparent). The results empirically confirm the claim in the literature that top 
management’s support to product safety plays an important role in product safety (Eads & Reuter, 
1983; Roland & Moriarty, 1983). They are consistent with White and Pomponi’s (2003) finding 
that firms with a safety-oriented strategy achieve better product safety performance. 
These findings are perhaps somewhat predictable given related results conceptually 
anchored in the literature, but our research confirms that these relationships are also carried by 
means of embedded practices in NPD. Our analysis showed that the relationship between product 
safety culture and CE and Design-for-Safety is strongly supported, and a strong indirect 
relationship between product safety culture and product safety performance was also observed in 
the SEM analysis, with an indirect effect of 0.45. This is in agreement with literature on product 
safety culture being critical for product safety (European Commission, 2008; Svenson, 1984; 
White & Pomponi, 2003).  
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The positive relationship predicted between Design-for-Safety and product safety 
performance is also strongly supported, as 61% of variance for product safety performance can 
be explained by Design-for-Safety. This finding is largely in line with previous findings that 
approximately 70% of product safety recalls were rooted in product design (Beamish & Bapuji, 
2008; White & Pomponi, 2003). 
Contrary to what was predicted, there was no significant relationship between 
management commitment to safety and Concurrent Engineering. Concurrent Engineering is 
0ften associated with shortened time-to-market, with cycle time the key and often sole 
performance indicator (Gerwin & Barrowman, 2002). However, time-to-market and product 
safety are often competing goals, and firms with a strong focus on product safety may not 
necessarily consider Concurrent Engineering as a practice to enhance product safety.  
Neither did we find a significant effect of Concurrent Engineering on Design-for-Safety 
and product safety performance, which was unexpected because empirical studies reported the 
use of CE teams having a positive effect on product quality performance (Koufteros, et al., 2002; 
Koufteros & Marcoulides, 2006; Sethi, 2000). There are five possible explanations: 
1. The mediating effect of DFS: based on the analysis in section 4.6, the relationship 
between CE and PSP is fully mediated by DFS; 
2. Mutual exclusive perception of the impact of CE on cycle time and product safety; 
3. Industry specificity: Juvenile products are not very complicated, and most of the 
product-related hazards have been captured by regulatory standards. Hazards or safety 
issues can still be detected during product safety tests and hazard analysis at a later stage, 
even if product safety engineers are not involved at an early stage in the NPD. Therefore, 
the use of CE is not necessarily linked with better product safety performance; 
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4. As CE is used widely by most firms, it is no longer a competitive differentiator. This 
finding echoes earlier studies such as Clark and Fujimoto (1991), who found that CE 
used in incremental projects decreased product quality, or Koufteros et al. (2001) who 
did not find any significant direct relationship between CE and quality;  
5. As some of the interviewees mentioned in our in-depth interviews, even if different 
groups participate during NPD in the early stages, in reality, different functions still 
focus on quite different aspects of the product. One of the interviewees commented, 
Concurrent Engineering “smooths the launch. I don’t think it will have impact on the 
safety of the products because different groups focus on different things. For example, 
manufacturing people are mainly interested in the timing, how to produce it, how to 
assemble it; purchasing people are mainly interested in communicating with suppliers, 
starting ordering the material…. I really don’t think it will have impact on the safety of 
the product as much as on the commercial side…to launch it smoother.”  
 
6.  Conclusions and implications 
6.1. Summary of results 
This paper pursued the questions of which NPD aspects lead to greater product safety and 
how does organizational culture influence NPD practices and product safety. Based on a survey 
of 255 quality and engineering managers in 126 firms in the juvenile products industry, we 
extend the literature with an empirical analysis of eight hypotheses linking organizational culture 
with new product development and product safety. Five out of eight hypotheses were supported, 
and R&D intensity was excluded as a moderating factor (see Table 10).  
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Table 10: Summary of the hypothesis testing results 
 H-# Hypotheses Result 
 1 MCS has a positive effect on PSC in NPD Supported 
 2 MCS has a positive effect on CE Not supported 
 3 MCS has a positive effect on DFS Supported 
 4 PSC in NPD has a positive effect on CE Supported 
 5 PSC in NPD has a positive effect on DFS Supported 
 6 CE has a positive effect on DFS Not supported 
 7 CE has a positive effect on PSP Not supported 
 8 DFS has a positive effect on PSP Supported 
 
6.2. Theoretical implications 
Grounded in organizational theory, this research contributes to the body of NPD and 
product safety management literature in several respects. First, we introduced and tested a 
conceptual framework for product safety management in NPD that integrates organizational 
culture, NPD practices, and safety management methodologies. The survey instrument and the 
structure model can be used as a foundation for further study of product safety in NPD. 
Second, previous literature had not addressed how product safety is best achieved as a 
result of optimized NPD policies and practices. This research supplements the previous NPD and 
safety management studies by integrating the product safety dimension as a dependent variable 
and incorporating product safety management methodologies. Our model represents the first 
reported attempt to empirically investigate the relationships among the five constructs in a 
rigorous approach with an unparalleled primary data set collected worldwide.  
Third, previous product safety literature mainly focused on the technical aspects and 
principles of safety management. Most of these studies were limited and prescriptive in nature. 
As a result, by integrating organizational culture with the Design-for-Safety techniques and 
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practices, this research has advanced a systematic and holistic view on product safety and 
provided empirical evidence to support (or reject) earlier prescriptions in the safety literature. 
Fourth, this study reveals that the use of CE has no direct relationship with product safety 
performance. The findings of this study rebut the recommendation that concurrent engineering 
should be used as a mechanism to ensure product safety.  Further research into the causes of the 
absence of this effect is necessary, along with the possible explanations outlined in the discussion. 
Finally, this research advances scientific understanding of innovation and NPD in the 
context of failure and product safety by looking at several factors that affect product safety in the 
product innovation process, which has always been a key activity in industry. However, if 
product safety is not well understood in relation to other key dimensions such as management 
commitment to safety, product safety culture, and the process of product innovation, random 
failure may be unavoidable. 
 
6.3. Managerial implications 
Combining the present analysis with qualitative aspects of our research, we argue that the 
three pillars of product safety are top management commitment to safety, a safety-first culture, 
and a robust Design-for-Safety, and the managerial implications include the following: 
1) Top management is the main driver of product safety, and with a safety-oriented strategy, 
management is in the position to commit necessary resources to implement best practices 
for safety management and make product safety a priority. NPD practices and product 
safety performance often varies between product categories and business units even 
within the same firm. Top management should “walk the talk” and get personally 
involved in product safety decisions.  
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2) Firms should build a product safety-oriented culture across the firm. Specifically, a firm 
should establish incentive programs to ensure all levels of employees understand the 
importance of product safety and position product safety as the firm’s top priority. 
Technical employees (R&D, engineering, quality, and production, etc.) should be trained 
on relevant product safety standards and safety management tools. The quality team 
should be empowered to make decisions on product safety independently (e.g., through 
independent product safety review teams). R&D and engineering teams should be trained 
to know how to design product safety into products. 
3) Firms ought to ensure a robust Design-for-Safety. Design-for-Safety is the only variable in 
the model that has a direct impact on product safety performance in product development. 
Therefore, manufacturers should implement an effective and efficient idea-to-launch 
process that is robust and controlled, and that emphasizes the quality of execution and, 
most importantly, incorporates professional safety management methodologies.  
As for CE, there is no doubt it will shorten time-to-market in NPD; however, it is not a 
determinant factor for product safety. For companies intending to improve product safety, CE 
should not be the top priority. 
 
6.4. Limitations and future research   
This research focused on the juvenile products industry, which has a large manufacturing 
share in China. However, other industries are more regulated than the juvenile products industry 
(e.g., pharmaceuticals), and others may have a greater balance of geographical distribution of 
product design, development, and manufacturing. As the dynamics may look different in other 
industries, this research needs to be replicated across industries, across geographies, and, ideally, 
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across time to ensure greater representation. In particular, time series analysis would be useful to 
permit the identification of causal relationships. Moreover, manufacturing accounts for a 
significant share of product safety issues, and future research should also investigate the effects 
of manufacturing practices on product safety through adding relevant constructs to the model. 
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